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THE UNEXONERATED:
FACTUALLY INNOCENT DEFENDANTS WHO PLEAD
GUILTY
John H. Blume* & Rebecca K. Helm**
“It’s a total injustice…These three men are being made to plead
guilty to something they did not do” (John Byers- father of one
of the alleged West Memphis Three victims)1
Abstract
Several recent high profile cases, including the case of the
West Memphis Three, have revealed (again), that factually
innocent defendants do plead guilty. And, more
disturbingly, in many of the cases, the defendant’s innocence
is known, or at least highly suspected, at the time the plea is
entered. Innocent defendants plead guilty most often, but
not always, in three sets of cases: first, low level offenses
where a quick guilty plea provides the key to the cellblock
door; second, cases where defendants have been wrongfully
convicted, prevail on appeal, and are then offered a plea
bargain which will assure their immediate or imminent
release and third, where defendants are threatened with
harsh alternative punishments if they do not plead guilty.
There are three primary contributing factors leading to a
criminal justice system where significant numbers of
innocent defendants plead guilty to crimes they did not
commit. The first is the perceived need that all defendants
must plead. The second is the current draconian sentencing
regime for criminal offenses. And, the final contributing
*Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. The authors would like to thank
the participants in the Cornell Law School summer workshop series for
their helpful comments and suggestions as well as the participants in the
faculty workshop at the University of South Carolina School of Law for
their insightful comments and suggestions, and also Professor Anna
Roberts for her useful comments and suggestions.
**L.L.M., Cornell Law School, 2011; Ph.D. Student, Cornell.
International Business Times Reporter, West Memphis Three Walk to
Freedom: Are They Really Innocent?, International Business Times, August
20 2011, http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/201046/20110820/westmemphis-three-walks-to-freedom-are-they-really-innocent-gulitydamien-echols-jason-baldwin-and.htm.
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factor is that plea bargaining is, for the most part, an
unregulated industry. This article discusses cases in which
innocent defendants pled guilty to obtain their release, thus
joining the “unexonerated,” explores the factors that “cause”
innocent defendants to plead guilty, and finally proposes
several options the criminal justice system could embrace to
avoid, or at least ameliorate, the plight of innocent
defendants who plead guilty.
I.

Introduction.

On August 19th 2011, Damien Echols, Jason Baldwin
and Jessie Misskelley, also known as the “West Memphis
Three,” were released from prison nearly eighteen years
after they were first arrested in connection with the murders
of three eight year old boys in West Memphis, Arkansas.2
Their freedom came at a significant cost however; to obtain
their release they pled guilty to crimes they almost certainly
did not commit. The deal offered by prosecutors was too
“good” to turn down. We might like to think that such
things don’t happen, or if they do, only very rarely, but,
innocent defendants do plead guilty more than most people
think, and certainly more often than anyone cares to admit.
In this article, we will discuss several cases in which this
occurred, the reasons why innocent defendants plead guilty,
and finally offer some tentative proposals to reduce the
number of instances in which this happens.
Let us begin with a more detailed discussion of the
West Memphis Three case to set the stage. The defendants
were arrested in 1993 after the bodies of three young boys –
Christopher Byers, Stevie Branch and Michael Moore – were
found naked and hogtied with their own shoelaces. The
victims’ clothing was found in a nearby creek. Byers had
deep lacerations and injuries to his scrotum and penis. An
autopsy revealed that Byers died from multiple injuries,3

Campbell Robertson, Deal Frees ‘West Memphis Three’ in Arkansas, N.Y.
Times,
August
19
2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08
/20/us/20arkansas.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

2

3

FRANK J. PERETTI, WILLIAM Q. STURNER, CHRISTOPHER BYERS AUTOPSY,
ARKANSAS STATE CRIME LABORATORY, May 7 1993, available at
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and the other two boys from multiple injuries with
drowning.4 Misskelley confessed to the murders following a
twelve hour police interrogation and implicated Echols and
Baldwin in his confession. Misskelley later recanted but was
convicted on the strength of his confession in February 1994
and sentenced to life imprisonment plus two twenty year
sentences.5 The prosecution’s case against Misskelley was
based almost entirely on his confession. In fact, without the
statements, the prosecution’s case could not have survived a
directed verdict motion.6
Echols and Baldwin were convicted of three counts of
capital murder shortly afterwards. The convictions were
largely based on prosecution arguments that the defendants
had been motivated as members of a satanic cult and
witnesses who said they had heard the teenagers speak of
the murders.7 Echols was sentenced to death and Baldwin
received a sentence of life imprisonment.8

http://www.autopsyfiles.org/reports/Other/west%20memphis%20thre
e/branch,%20steve.pdf
4

FRANK J. PERETTI, WILLIAM Q. STURNER, STEVE BRANCH AUTOPSY,
ARKANSAS STATE CRIME LABORATORY, May 7 1993, available at
http://www.autopsyfiles.org/reports/Other/west%20memphis%20thre
e/branch,%20steve.pdf; FRANK J. PERETTI, WILLIAM Q. STURNER, MICHAEL
MOORE AUTOPSY, ARKANSAS STATE CRIME LABORATORY, May 7 1993,
available
at:
http://www.autopsyfiles.org/reports/Other/west
%20memphis%20three/moore,%20james%20michael%20.pdf
5

Youth is Convicted in Slaying of 3 Boys in Arkansas City, N.Y. Times,
February 5 1994, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/05/us/youth-isconvicted-in-slaying-of-3-boys-in-an-arkansas-city.html
6

See Misskelley v State of Arkansas, 323 Ark. 449 (1996) at 459, where the
Supreme Court of Arkansas states regarding Misskelley’s case, “The
statements [confessions made by Misskelley] were the strongest evidence
offered against the appellant at trial. In fact, they were virtually the only
evidence, all other testimony and exhibits serving primarily as
corroboration”.
7

8

Campbell Robertson, Deal Frees ‘West Memphis Three’ in Arkansas, supra.
Id.
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In 2007, new evidence came to light. DNA testing
revealed that biological material found at the crime scene
did not belong to the victims or the three convicted
defendants.9 However, a hair found in one of the knots on
one of the hogtied bodies was determined to be “not
inconsistent” with a DNA sample obtained from the
stepfather of one of the victims (who was also the last person
seen with the victims).10 Evidence of juror misconduct
involving the foreperson of the jury was discovered,11 and a
witness who allegedly told police she had seen the
defendants in the area where the crime occurred recanted
her testimony.12
On November 4th 2010, the Arkansas Supreme Court
ordered a state trial judge to determine whether the new
DNA evidence rendered the convictions invalid.13 However,
before the hearing took place, the prosecution offered the
West Memphis Three a “get out of jail” (but not free)
opportunity. Although they would have to plead guilty to
lesser charges, the three men would not have to admit their
guilt; they would be permitted to plead guilty while still
maintaining their innocence using what is commonly called
an Alford plea.14 And, the agreed upon sentence would be
Shaila Dewan, Defense Offers New Evidence in a Murder Case that Shocked
Arkansas, N.Y Times, October 30 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007
/10/30/us/30satanic.html. In fact, no DNA from the three alleged
perpetrators had ever been discovered at the crime scene or on any item
of evidence.
9

10

Id.

11

Campbell Robertson, Deal Frees ‘West Memphis Three’ in Arkansas,
supra.
12

Tim Hackler, Complete Fabrication, Arkansas Times, October 7 2004,
http://www.arktimes.com/arkansas/completefabrication/Content?oid
=1886107.
13

14

Echols v State of Arkansas, 2010 Ark. 417.

Campbell Robertson, Deal Frees ‘West Memphis Three’ in Arkansas,
supra.
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time served. Thus each defendant would be released
immediately from prison after the pleas were entered. But, it
was a “package” deal, and was null and void unless all three
defendants said yes.15 After some hesitation, all three
defendants accepted the bargain, entered the pleas and were
released.16
Was justice served? The plea bargain did secure the
defendant’s freedom after eighteen years of confinement. It
also ensured that Echols would not be executed. Almost any
criminal defense lawyer, including the authors of this essay,
would have advised them to take it (and would have cajoled
them to take it if they hesitated). However their freedom
came at a high price; the three men pled guilty to a murder
they adamantly maintained they did not commit, which the
overwhelming weight of the evidence suggested they did
not commit, and which almost no one in the community
where the crime occurred believed they committed.
Furthermore, because a plea is a conviction, the three men
are now all “convicted murderers.” This will continue to
have significant effects on their ability to find employment,
they are deprived of most of their civil rights and of any civil
remedy they possibly had against either the police or
prosecutors, leaving them without any compensation for the
eighteen years of wrongful imprisonment.
The prosecution’s plea offer was (and was designed
to be) highly coercive. The chances that any one of the three
would have been found guilty at a new trial were slim; the
prosecutors admitted as much.17 But, the prospect of
David Koon, Jason’s choice: friendship, freedom and a principled stand,
Arkansas Times, August 24 2011, http://www.arktimes.com
/arkansas/jasons-choice/Content?oid=1888400
15

16

Campbell Robertson, Deal Frees ‘West Memphis Three’ in Arkansas,
supra.
See Max Brantley, Prosecutor’s Statement on West Memphis 3 Plea
Deal, Arkansas Times, August 19 2011, http://www.arktimes.com
/ArkansasBlog/archives/2011/08/19/prosecutors-statement-on-westmemphis-3-plea-deal (in which the prosecutor, Scott Ellington, states: “it
would be practically impossible to put on a proper case against the
defendants in this particular case after eighteen years of extended
litigation”).
17
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immediate release from prison made “rolling the dice” at a
new trial (assuming the judge ordered one) a risky
proposition, and one not many persons imprisoned for
nearly two decades would be likely to take, or one any
competent attorney would advise them to take. Adding to
the coercion was the condition that if any of the three
rejected the offer, the other two could not take advantage of
the deal. This put great pressure on Misskelley and Baldwin
to accept the plea for their friend’s sake; Echols was still on
death row and faced the possibility of execution.18 In fact,
press accounts revealed that Baldwin did not want to plead
guilty and would have preferred to take his chances before a
new jury. “This was not justice,” he said immediately
following the plea. “However, they’re trying to kill Damien,
sometimes you just have to bite down to save somebody.”19
Echols later thanked Baldwin at a press conference for his
decision to accept the plea despite his misgivings.20
The “deal” in this case almost certainly resulted in
three innocent men pleading guilty to something they did
not do. They were offered a deal they could not realistically
refuse. They now stand “convicted” of the murders of three
young boys. Should such a result be tolerated? Should
prosecutors be allowed to coerce factually innocent
defendants to plead guilty to crimes they did not commit? It
is a question worth asking because the West Memphis Three
case is not unique. Innocent defendants plead guilty quite
frequently. It is one of many dark secrets of the criminal
justice system.
As we will discuss below, the modern American
criminal justice system has three features that create the

18

David Koon, Jason’s choice: friendship, freedom and a principled stand,
supra.
19

20

Id.

“West Memphis Three”: Damien Echols overwhelmed by release, CBS News,
August 19 2011, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-20094730504083.html.
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hydraulic pressure which increases the risk of innocent
defendants pleading guilty: (1) the system’s need (or at least
perceived need) for the overwhelming majority of
defendants to plead guilty; (2) draconian sentences for many
offenses and offenders; and, (3) an almost complete lack of
judicial regulation of the plea bargaining process. These
three factors combine to create a system in which innocent
defendants can be coerced to plead guilty.

II.

A Brief History of Plea Bargaining

We next provide a brief overview of the history of
plea bargaining, a subject which (many) entire books have
been written about.21
Plea bargaining first became common in the United
States in the mid-1800s,22 and by 1967 the American Bar
Association was beginning to embrace the practice, noting
that it was necessary given the system’s lack of resources.23
However, the constitutionality of the practice was not firmly
established until 1970.24 Negotiated pleas became the
21

See, e.g., GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH, A HISTORY OF
PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003), MIKE MCCONVILLE AND CHESTER
MIRSKY, JURY TRIALS AND PLEA BARGAINING: A TRUE HISTORY (2005);
MARY E VOGEL, COERCION TO COMPROMISE: PLEA BARGAINING, THE
COURTS AND THE MAKING OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY (2007).
JENIA I. TURNER, PLEA BARGAINING ACROSS BORDERS: CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE (2009)

22

23

See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY 2 (Approved draft 1968).
See Brady v United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). Robert Brady was
indicted in 1959 for kidnapping and failing to release a hostage without
harm, which carried a maximum penalty of death penalty. But, he could
only be sentenced to death if: a) he went to trial; b) was convicted; and, c)
the jury recommended death as the appropriate punishment. Brady
chose to plead guilty to avoid the risk of capital punishment, and he was
sentenced to fifty years imprisonment. Eight years later, Brady
challenged the constitutionality of his guilty plea based on the Supreme
Court’s intervening decision in United States v Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 583
(1968), which held that the statutory scheme authorizing the death
penalty only for those who went to trial had the “inevitable effect…to
24
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primary means of disposition of criminal cases as crime rates
rose in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s and as the number of
state and federal crimes proliferated in response to public
demand for action. For example, the number of felony
prosecutions (and the number of prison inmates) more than
doubled between 1978 and 1990.25 The increase in the
number of cases was not accompanied by sufficient
additional resources to handle them, i.e., additional
prosecutors, public defenders and judges.26 Thus, it quickly
became generally accepted that the system could only
process the growing backlog of cases by reducing the
number of trials. To reduce trials, it was essential that more
defendants plead guilty.27 And, they did.
Today plea bargaining is accepted as an essential and
permanent component of the American criminal justice
system. Between 2008 and 2012 more than 96% of all
resolved criminal cases culminated in plea bargains rather
than trial.28 In 2012, 97% of cases that were resolved were
settled through pleas, with only 3% being adjudicated in
discourage assertion of the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty
and to deter exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury
trial.” Brady argued that his plea was invalid as it was induced by the
threat of death. The Court, however, held that Brady’s plea was knowing
and intelligent at the time it was entered; he understood the risks and
obtained the benefit of the bargain. Id. at 756. Furthermore, the Court
determined that the criminal justice system could not operate if
intervening decisions upset pleas previously entered. Id.
William J Stuntz, Bordenkircher v Hayes: Plea Bargaining and the
Decline of the Rule of Law in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 351, 378
(STEIKER, 2005).

25

For e.g. From 1974 to 1990, almost the same period in which caseloads
doubled, the number of assistant prosecutors nationwide rose less than
20%, from 17,000 to 20,000 (BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, US
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS (1990), at 1,
available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/psc90.pdf)
26

27

Stuntz, supra at 363.

US SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2012 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS, FIGURE C, http://www.ussc.gov/Research
_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2012/sbtoc12.htm
28
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bench or jury trials.29 As Justice Kennedy recently observed:
“the reality [is] that the criminal justice system today is for
the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”30
And the view of pleas has changed. Once thought to be a
“necessary evil,”31 plea bargaining is now applauded as an
efficient means of disposition. Two terms ago, in a different
case, Justice Kennedy, again speaking for a majority of the
Court, stated: “[t]o note the prevalence of plea bargaining is
not to criticize it. The potential to conserve valuable
prosecutorial resources and for defendants to admit their
crimes and receive more favorable terms at sentencing
means that a plea agreement can benefit both parties.”32
The system’s need for defendants to plead guilty
The current conventional wisdom is that without the
ability to dispose of the vast majority of cases through plea
bargaining, the criminal justice system would collapse
inwardly upon itself like a legal black hole. More than forty
years ago, then Chief Justice Warren Burger stated that “a
reduction from 90% to 80% in guilty pleas requires the
assignment of twice the judicial manpower and facilities”
and, “a reduction to 70% trebles the demand.”33 Regardless
of whether the former Chief Justice’s resource allocation
assessments are accurate, it is almost universally accepted by
the participants in the system that there are not enough
29

Id.

30

Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012).

Lafler, supra at 1397 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“until today, [plea
bargaining] has been regarded as a necessary evil. It presents grave risks
of prosecutorial overcharging that effectively compels an innocent
defendant to avoid massive risk by pleading guilty to a lesser offense ;
and for guilty defendants it often—perhaps usually—results in a
sentence well below what the law prescribes for the actual crime. But
even so we accept plea bargaining because many believe that without it
our long and expensive process of criminal trial could not sustain the
burden imposed on it, and of system of justice would grind to a halt”).
31

32

Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1407-08 (2012).

33

Warren E. Burger, The State of the Judiciary, 56 A.B.A. J. 929, 931 (1970).

THE UNEXONERATED

10

personnel, court time or funds to try every case, or for that
matter even any significant percentage of cases.34 In
Santobello v New York the Supreme Court concluded plea
bargaining was: "… an essential component of the
administration of justice...If every criminal charge were
subjected to a full scale trial, the States and the Federal
Government would need to multiply by many times the
number of judges and court facilities.”35 Thus while some
critics question the fairness and integrity of a system that
must forego trials to survive, the practice is not going
away.36 Quite the contrary; as noted by the Supreme Court
in Missouri v Frye: “In today’s criminal justice system the
negotiation of a plea bargain rather than the unfolding of a
trial, is almost always the critical point for a defendant”.37
Draconian sentences for many offenses and offenders
Assuming that it is correct and desirable (or at least
necessary) that most defendants plead guilty, the most
effective way for the prosecution to induce pleas is to offer
incentives to defendants to waive their right to trial.
However, the rise in crime rates described above was
accompanied by a political demand to “get tough” on

See Hessick and Saujani, Plea Bargaining and Convicting the Innocent The
Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel, and the Judge, 16 BYU J. Pub. L.
189 at 227 (2002) (outlining the argument that plea bargaining is
necessary for system efficiency); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71
(1977) (“whatever might be the situation in an ideal world, the fact is that
the guilty plea and the often concomitant plea bargain are important
components of this country’s criminal justice system. Properly
administered they can benefit all concerned”).

34

35

404 U.S. 257 (1971), at 260

36

See Q2 2013 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SECOND
QUARTER FY2013 QUARTERLY SENTENCING UPDATE, TABLE 22 at
http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Federal_Sentencing_Statistic
s/Quarterly_Sentencing_Updates/USSC_2013_Quarter_Report_2nd.pdf
(showing that from October 1 2012 to March 31 2013, 96.9% of criminal
cases were resolved by plea rather than by trial).
37

Frye, supra at 1408
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crime.38 Thus during the same period, minimum and
maximum sentences also rose sharply, as did the enactment
of a variety of recidivist statutes.39 Furthermore, in the same
era, legal definitions of criminal intent and liability were also
expanded making it easier to convict defendants of more
serious crimes. Given the new weapons in their inducement
arsenal, prosecutors began to “encourage” guilty pleas by
threatening harsher punishments.40 As legislatures added
new crimes and increased sentences, a “menu” was created
giving a charging list of sentencing options to prosecutors to
extract bargains.41 This created a plea bargaining system
whereby extremely coercive “deals” were offered to
defendants both in terms of incentives to forego trial and
avoidance of much harsher punishment.
Lack of judicial regulation of the plea bargaining process
The system can operate in such a coercive manner
because plea bargaining is, for the most part, an unregulated
“industry.” It is true that there are some statutes and rules
that provide guidelines and limits on plea bargaining.42 In
federal cases, for example, the judge who accepts the plea
must be satisfied that there is “a factual basis” for it, advise
the defendant whether the court is bound by the parties’
recommendations, decide whether to accept or reject the
plea agreement and ensure the proceedings are captured in a
verbatim record to facilitate review.43 However, judicial
focus for the most part is on whether the plea was knowing
and intelligent. The determination of whether the plea
agreement is truly voluntary does not depend on the
substantive terms or generosity of the bargain. Because a
38

Stuntz, supra at 378.

39

Id.

40

Id.

41

Id.

See, e.g.,Ariz Crim Proc Rule 17.4; Colo Crim Proc Rule 11(f); Fed Rules
Crim Proc Rule 11.
42

43

Fed. R. of Crim. Pro. P. 11.
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plea is only involuntary when it is “the result of force or
threats or of promises” extraneous to the agreement itself,44
prosecutors have wide latitude in setting the terms of plea
arrangements.45
Debate regarding the current system and conviction of
innocent defendants
This system, including its desirability and morality
have been, and continue to be, debated in the academy and
by judges and practicing lawyers. The academic literature is
varied in its reaction to plea bargaining and consists
primarily of both attempts to provide a theoretical
justification for plea bargaining,46 and critiques of the
44

Fed. R. of Crim. Pro. P. 11(b)(2).

45For

example, as noted previously, in Brady v United States, the Court
held that the threat of the death penalty could be used to induce a guilty
plea as long as the plea was knowing and intelligent. Furthermore, a
large differential between the sentence a defendant would face after trial,
and the sentence he receives under the terms of the plea agreement, does
not render the agreement involuntary. Bordenkircher v Hayes (434 U.S. 357
(1978) effectively rejected the suggestion that prosecutors cannot
threaten a criminal punishment that has not been applied, at least
occasionally, to similarly situated defendants. This means that a charge
that would not have been bought originally could be threatened if a
guilty plea was rejected. Justice Powell was critical of this in his Hayes’
dissent stating: “[t]he question that must be asked is whether the
prosecutor might have reasonably charged the respondent under the Act
in the first place.” While the Federal Sentencing Guidelines may have
remedied this to some extent, for example by only allowing a maximum
sentence reduction of 25% from the benchmark sentence in return for a
guilty plea, this was largely neutralized by the case of United States v
Booker 543 U.S. 220 (2005) which reduced the status of the guidelines
from binding to advisory.
See, e.g., Thomas W. Church, Jr., In Defense of “Bargain Justice,” 13 L. &
Soc'y Rev. 509, 511 (1979) (defending the rationality of the plea
bargaining system against critics); James E Bond, PLEA BARGAINING AND
GUILTY PLEAS 2D. ED. NEW YORK: CLARK BOARDMAN & CO., 1982
(discussing the constitutional status of plea bargaining and standards for
accepting guilty pleas); Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a
Market System, 12 J. Legal Stud. 289, 308-09 (1983) (arguing that pleabargaining is desirable as a mechanism for setting the price of crime);
Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale
L.J. 1909 (1992) (setting forth a contract theory of plea bargaining and
urging structural modifications to account for innocent defendants),
46
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current plea bargaining process.47 Some object to the new
reality of plea bargaining on the basis that it diminishes
community participation in the criminal justice system,
places too much power (and coercive power) in the hands of
prosecutors rather than neutral judges, often pits lawyers
against their clients thus eroding the attorney-client
relationship, and allows defense counsel to “cut corners.”48
Frank H Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 Yale L.J. 1969
(1992) (defending plea bargaining based on autonomy and efficiency);
Scott W Howe, The Value of Plea Bargaining, 58 Okla. L. Rev. 599, 603
(2005) (arguing that plea bargaining is valuable as it maximizes deserved
punishment at a reasonable cost and generally treats defendants fairly).

Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing The Criminal Defendants Right to
Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. Chi. L. R. 931, 932
(1968) lists some common objections: plea bargaining makes a
substantial part of an offender's sentence depend, not upon what he did
or his personal characteristics, but upon a tactical decision irrelevant to
any proper objective of criminal proceedings. In contested cases, it
substitutes a regime of split-the-difference for a judicial determination of
guilt or innocence and elevates a concept of partial guilt above the
requirement that criminal responsibility be established beyond a
reasonable doubt. It also deprecates the value of human liberty and the
purposes of the criminal sanction by treating these things as
commodities to be traded for economic savings—savings that, when
measured against common social expenditures, usually seem minor; see
also, Katherine J. Strandburg, Deterrence and the Conviction of Innocents, 35
Conn. L. Rev. 1321, 1336 (2003) (using an economic model of costs and
benefits to review law enforcement strategies to suggest that the
widespread use of plea bargaining may in fact decrease deterrence);
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 Yale L.J. 1979, 1992
(1992) (challenging the contract defense of plea bargaining); Daniel
Givelber, Punishing Protestations of Innocence: Denying Responsibility and
Its Consequences, 37 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1363, 1364-71, 1384 (2000)
(contending that plea bargaining unfairly punishes virtually everyone
who insists upon trial); Dervan and Edkins, The Innocent Defendant’s
Dilemma: An Innovative Empirical Study of Plea Bargaining’s Innocence
Problem 103 Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 1 (2012) (discussing
a study involving school children in which more than half of the
innocent participants were willing to falsely admit guilt for a benefit).
47

See, e.g., Albert Alschuler, Lafler and Frye: Two Small Band-Aids for a
Festering Wound, 51 Duq. L. Rev. 673 (noting that the plea bargaining
system subjects defense attorneys to temptations to disregard their
clients interests); Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of
Trial, 117 Harv. L. R. 2463 (2004) (noting a lack of oversight of lawyers in
the plea bargaining process); William Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal
Laws Disappearing Shadow, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2548 (2004) (describing the

48
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Proponents of plea bargaining counter that it promotes
efficiency and autonomy, it is essential, according to its
defenders, that criminal cases be resolved without trials.49
They also maintain that despite the potentially coercive
power placed in prosecutor’s hands, even an innocent
defendant is better off when she chooses to plead guilty in
order to assure a more lenient result if she concludes that
there is a risk of wrongful conviction at trial.50 By allowing a
defendant to choose whether to accept a plea bargain or take
their chances at trial, the rational defendant (so the theory
goes) will only choose to plead guilty if the chances of being
found guilty are high (or process costs are high compared to
the costs of a guilty plea). Therefore, according to this school
of thought, even innocent defendants gain from plea
bargaining. A further advantage of the plea bargaining
system is said to be respect for an individual’s autonomy in
that it gives the defendant some ability to control her
destiny.51
Relying on the consensual nature of the practice, the
Supreme Court, as noted above, has praised plea bargaining
as benefiting all participants in the criminal justice system as

criminal law as a “menu” of options which prosecutors can use to dictate
the terms of plea bargains).
49

See, e.g., Santobello v New York 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (“"…the
disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor
and the accused, sometimes loosely called ‘plea bargaining’ is an
essential component of the administration of justice...If every criminal
charge were subjected to a full scale trial, the States and the Federal
Government would need to multiply by many times the number of
judges and court facilities.”)
Josh Bowers, Punishing The Innocent, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1117 (2008),
1158-1159.

50

Joseph Goldstein, For Harold Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human
Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 84 Yale L.J.
683, 685 (1975) (arguing that the rules governing plea bargaining “are
rooted in a basic commitment . . . to respect human dignity by protecting
the right of every adult to determine what he shall do and what may be
done to him”).
51
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well as the public.52 The Court has focused on the supposed
benefits, even in cases where there is strong evidence of
vindictive treatment and coercive tactics. For example, in
Bordenkircher v Hayes,53 Justice Stewart’s majority opinion
defended the practice against a challenge based on the
prosecutor’s decision to increase the charges with “unique
severity”54 against a defendant who refused to plead guilty.
Hayes was indicted for uttering a forged instrument in the
amount of $88.30. The prosecutor offered Hayes a term of
five years imprisonment in exchange for a guilty plea.55
Hayes, believing five years was excessive given the modest
amount of funds illegally obtained, turned it down. Because
Hayes had two prior felony convictions for similar offenses,
the prosecutor then indicted Hayes, as he had promised he
would, under the Kentucky Habitual Criminal Act. Hayes
was convicted and sentenced to the mandatory term of life
imprisonment with the possibility of parole.56 Hayes argued
that the prosecutor’s actions were vindictive and thus
violated the Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court
rejected Hayes’ due process challenge, even though the
prosecutor conceded that he charged Hayes as a habitual
criminal for the purpose of inducing a plea.57 Despite
previous decisions establishing that state practices designed
to discourage the assertion of constitutional rights, including

Santobello, supra, at 261 (“Disposition of charges after plea
discussions… leads to prompt and largely final disposition of most
criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced
idleness during pretrial confinement for those who are denied release
pending trial; it protects the public from those accused persons who are
prone to continue criminal conduct even while on pretrial release; and,
by shortening the time between charge and disposition, it enhances
whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are
ultimately imprisoned”).
52

53434

U.S. 357 (1978).

54

Id. at 372.

55

Id.

56

Id. at 359.

57

Id. at 370
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the right to jury trial, are “patently unconstitutional,”58 the
Court determined that since the prosecutor could have
legitimately charged Hayes under the Habitual Criminal Act
initially had he chosen to do so, it was not vindictive (in the
constitutional sense) to use the act to induce the plea after
Hayes rejected the initial offer. Justice Stewart’s majority
opinion also hailed the virtues of plea bargaining: “properly
administered plea bargaining can benefit all concerned,” and
described plea bargaining as “give and take” negotiations
between sides with relatively equal bargaining power.59
Emphasizing mutual advantage, with both sides gaining by
agreements to persuade defendants to plead to lesser
charges, the Court stated that it is completely legitimate for a
prosecutor to “induce [pleas] by promises of a
recommendation of a lenient sentence or reduction of
charged and thus by fear of the possibility of a greater
penalty upon conviction after a trial,”60
But saying it is so, even if it is the Supreme Court that
says it, does not make it so. In many cases, there is no true
mutuality of advantage, or true free choice for defendants
given the highly coercive nature of the practice. As others
have noted, Hayes allows a prosecutor to apply leverage by
filing charges that would not have been brought against the
defendant absent plea bargaining considerations and which
no one, including the prosecutor that levies them, believes
are appropriate.61 Superficially, the defendant appears to
receive a benefit if the prosecutor agrees to dismiss the
added charges in exchange for a guilty plea, but the benefit
58

See, Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32 n. 20a

59Hayes,

60Id.

supra at 362

at 363

61 Stephen Ross, Ignoring Prosecutorial Abuse in Plea Bargaining, 66 Cal. L.
Rev. 875, 879 (1978); see also William Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal
Law’s Disappearing Shadow, supra (“Criminal law is different. Its primary
role is not to define obligations, but to create a menu of options for
prosecutors. If the menu is long enough – and it usually is – prosecutors
can dictate the terms of plea bargains. When that is so, litigants…bargain
in the shadow of prosecutors preferences, budget constraints, and
political trends”).
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is, in reality, illusory. Innocent defendants, even those who
are unlikely to be found guilty at trial, are pleading guilty.62
The lack of advantage to many innocent defendants is
exacerbated by the fact that prosecutors often offer the
strongest incentives to defendants in cases where the
evidence is weakest, as it is necessary to do so to secure a
conviction.63 Here, the mutuality of advantage argument
does not work as prosecutors can extract a guilty plea in
almost any case, regardless of the defendant’s guilt or
innocence, by dramatically changing the cost-benefit
analysis.64 Rarely will a defendant refuse to consider any
plea offer at all. Many defendants, even innocent ones, are
willing to accept a lesser punishment in return for avoiding
the risk of a much harsher sentence following conviction
62

See Michael O Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis of Guilty Plea Practices
in the Federal Courts, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 293 (1975) (concluding that more
than two-thirds of “marginal” plea bargain defendants would be
acquitted or dismissed if they were to contest their cases).
See Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 50, 59-65 (1968) (suggesting that prosecutors offer the best
bargains in weak cases, including ones in which defendant may be
innocent); see also James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial
Power, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1521 (1981), at 1534-35 (explaining why
prosecutors are likely to offer the greatest incentives for those defendants
with the greatest chance of acquittal at trial); Welsh S. White, A Proposal
for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 439 (1971) at
451 (“According to Martin Erdman, New York prosecutors often reduce
their sentence recommendations by at least fifty percent if they believe
that there is a fifty percent chance of a hung jury, and by a great deal
more if they believe that there is a fifty percent chance of acquittal”).

63

64The

coercive nature of pleas can be illustrated by looking at the
sentencing results in cases where defendants plead guilty compared to
sentences imposed on defendants convicted at trial. Beverley Cook
found, for example, that persons charged with violations of the Federal
Selective Service Act who were convicted at jury trials received sentences
about twice as severe as offenders who pled guilty (Cook, Sentencing
Behavior of Federal Judges: Draft Cases 1972, 42 U. Cin. L. Rev. 597, 609
(Table 3) (1973)) and Hans Zeisel found that the sentences of New York
City defendants convicted at trial were 136% more severe than those
proposed by prosecutors in pretrial offers to the same defendants.
(Zeisel, The Offer That Cannot Be Refused, in F ZIMRING & R FRASE, THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, MATERIALS ON THE ADMINISTRATION AND
REFORM OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 558, 561 (1980).
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(even if the risk is very small).65 Thus prosecutors can extract
guilty pleas even from defendants who are likely to be found
not guilty at trial.66 These defendants do not benefit from the
plea in any genuine sense. This is an especially effective
tactic in cases where capital punishment is a potential
sentencing option. The possibility of being sentenced to
death, even if it is remote, can lead defendants, even
innocent ones, to plead guilty to get the death penalty “off
the table.”67
And, the theoretical mutuality of advantage is
virtually non-existent in this context. The reality is that there
is little defense counsel can do to protect their clients.
Prosecutors have the clear and undeniable upper hand; they
can overcharge, leverage overbroad laws, exploit the
information imbalance, wear down the defendant with
(often extended) pre-trial incarceration and top it off with
the possibility of a draconian sentence to shape the bargain
in such cases.68

65

See Russel D Covey, Longitudinal Guilt: Repeat Offenders, Plea
Bargaining, and the Variable Standard of Proof, 63 FLA Rev 431, 450, (2011),
(“When the deal is good enough, it is rational to refuse to roll the dice,
regardless of whether one believes the evidence establishes guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, and regardless of whether one is factually
innocent. The risk of inaccurate results in the plea bargaining system
thus seems substantial”); Donald G Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea
Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U.Ill. L. Rev. 37, 49
(“The reality of sentencing differentials is generally enough to deprive
defendants of any real choice in plea bargaining”).
See Finkelstein, supra (concluding that more than two-thirds of
“marginal” plea bargain defendants would be acquitted or dismissed if
they were to contest their cases).
66

See Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in
Potentially Capital Cases, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 21, 63 (1987) (reviewing five
cases in which innocent defendants pled guilty in order to avoid the risk
of a death sentence), see also http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/01/us/
released-but-not-exonerated-kerry-max-cook-fights-for-true-freedom.
html?r=2&hp (describing the case of Kerry Max Cook).
67

See Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism, 70 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
1049, 1065-66 (2013) (noting that mandatory minimum sentences and
heavy trial penalties often pressure defendants into pleading guilty no
matter how good their lawyers are, the structural challenges of fair plea
68
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The Curious Case of the Alford Plea
Further evidence of the criminal justice system’s
addiction to guilty pleas (even in cases where a defendant
might be innocent) can be found in the Supreme Court’s
decision in North Carolina v Alford.69 Henry Alford was
charged with first degree murder. The prosecution
announced its intention to seek the death penalty. Then, the
state offered Alford a deal. If he pled guilty to second degree
murder, he would be sentenced to a term of imprisonment.
Alford took it. During the plea colloquy, he adamantly
insisted that he was innocent, and that he was only pleading
guilty because of the substantial down side risks.70 When the
case reached the Supreme Court, it held that defendants may
knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty, even while
protesting their innocence, if the judge determines there is
“strong evidence of actual guilt.”71 The plea was not
constitutionally defective, even though Alford’s primary
motivation for the plea was avoiding the death penalty,72
because the standard for determining the validity of guilty
pleas “remains whether the plea represents a voluntary and
intelligent choice among the alternative course of action
open to the defendant.”73
While the Alford plea was not officially acknowledged
by the Supreme Court until 1970, nolo contendere pleas, also
grounded in not admitting guilt, have existed since medieval
times.74 Nolo contendere (or no contest) pleas originated
bargaining far exceed the question of counsel’s performance in
individual cases).
69

400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970).

70

Id. at 27-28

71

Id. at 37-38

72

Id. at 31

73

Id. at 31

74

Warren Moise, Sailing Between the Scilla and Charybdis: Nolo Contendere
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from a procedure whereby a defendant, hoping to avoid
imprisonment, tried to end the prosecution by offering
money to the King without admitting guilt.75 Although the
practical consequences of the two pleas are basically the
same, Alford and nolo contendere pleas differ in two
respects.76 First, unlike Alford pleas, nolo contendere pleas
generally avoid estoppel in later litigation. Second,
defendants who plead nolo contendere simply refuse to
admit guilt, while defendants making Alford pleas
affirmatively protest their innocence. The Supreme Court
determined there was no constitutional difference between
the pleas because “the Constitution is concerned with the
practical consequences, not the formal categorizations, of
state law.”77 Today, forty-seven states permit Alford pleas.78
When one steps back a bit from the world as we
currently know it, the Alford plea is a curious legal construct.
It permits someone who insists that they are innocent to
plead guilty to a crime they do not acknowledge
committing; guilty but not guilty. One would think that if a
defendant says he did not commit the crime, the criminal
justice system would insist on a trial to resolve the question.
Although there is some efficiency gained by allowing Alford
pleas; the primary one being that it allows guilty defendants
to plea bargain while saving face with their spouses,
children, parents and/or friends,79 the device provides
and Alford Pleas, S.C law, May 17, 2006, at 10 (citing F. POLLACK & F.
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 517 (2d ed. 1909)).
75

Id.

Claire Molesworth, Knowledge Versus Acknowledgement: Rethinking the
Alford Plea in Sexual Assault Cases, 6 Seattle J. Soc. Just. 907, 912 (2008).

76

77

Alford, supra at 37.

Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and
Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 Corn.
L. Rev. 1361, 1372 (2003).
78

Proof of this lies in the fact that Alford pleas are most commonly used
in cases involving sexual assault, violence and white collar crime.
Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and
Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas. Id.
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additional incentives for factually innocent defendants to
plead as they can receive the benefits of a guilty plea without
having to falsely admit guilt. Alford pleas, therefore,
exacerbate the risk of truly innocent defendants pleading
guilty.
III.

Why Do Innocent Defendants Plead Guilty?

In an ideal world, factually innocent defendants
would not be charged with crimes they did not commit. In
that same world, innocent defendants who were wrongly
charged would never plead guilty, but would go to trial and
be acquitted by a jury of their peers. But that is not the world
we live in.
We now know, for example, due to the
availability of DNA testing, that at least twenty-nine
individuals who pled guilty to crimes they did not commit
served a combined total of more than one hundred and fifty
years in prison before their exonerations.80 Why do they do
it?
There are three principal reasons why innocent
defendants plead guilty. First, innocent persons charged
with relatively minor offenses often plead guilty in order to
get out of jail, to avoid the hassle of having criminal charges
hanging over their heads, or to avoid being punished for
exercising their right to trial. Second, defendants who were
wrongfully convicted, but have their conviction vacated on
direct appeal or in post-conviction review proceedings,
plead guilty to receive a sentence of time served and obtain
their immediate (or at least imminent) freedom. Third, some

See http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/When_the_Innocent
_Plead_Guilty.php. The Innocent Project estimate that false confessions
are involved in about 25% of wrongful convictions that are later
overturned by DNA testing. To give a few examples, John Dixon pled
guilty in 1991 to a rape he did not commit and spent ten years in prison
before being exonerated by DNA evidence, Christiopher Ochoa pled
guilty in 1989 to a murder he did not commit and spent nearly twelve
years in prison before DNA testing led to his exoneration and Jerry
Frank Townsend pled guilty in the 1970s to six murders and one rape
and served nearly twenty-two years in prison before DNA testing led to
his exoneration.
80
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innocent defendants plead guilty due to the fear of a harsh
alternative punishment, e.g., the death penalty.81
A. Defendants charged with minor or relatively
minor offenses.
The largest category is the first; innocent persons
charged with relatively minor offences. Spend time talking
to any “front line” public defender or persons in our poorest
communities and they will tell you that many innocent
defendants charged with relatively minor crimes plead
guilty in order to get out of jail or avoid spending additional
time in jail. In many of these cases, the defendants do not
have a constitutional right to an attorney or a jury trial, and,
especially if they are incarcerated pre-trial, will plead guilty
just to get out of jail.82 The incentives are quite strong; most
of these defendants are poor, and thus unable to afford
bond, retain counsel or care for their families. In many
instances, they already have some kind of criminal record,
and in the communities in which they live the stigma of a
81

There are also potential (but likely smaller) fourth and fifth categories
of cases in which innocent defendants plead guilty, which we will not
discuss in detail here. The fourth category consists of innocent
defendants who have a prior conviction but whose only chance of
acquittal at trial is to testify in their own defense. But, due to the very
real fear that they will be impeached with the prior conviction and the
jury will – despite instructions to the contrary – draw a propensity
inference from the prior conviction that the defendant is guilty, the
defendant elects to plead guilty. See John H Blume, The Dilemma of the
Criminal Defendant with a Prior Record – Lessons from the Wrongfully
Convicted, 5 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 477 (2008) (noting
numerous instances of innocent defendants who did not testify in their
own defense – some of whom pled guilty – because they had a prior
conviction). The fifth category consists of innocent defendants who make
false confessions due to coercive interrogation by the police and plead
guilty, on advice of counsel, due to the difficulty in persuading jurors
that people do, in fact, confess to crimes they did not commit. See
Douglas Starr, Do police interrogation techniques produce false confessions?,
The New Yorker, December 9 2013, http://www.newyorker.com/
reporting/2013/12/09/131209fa_fact_starr.
82

Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. Cal. L. Rev, 101, 134-135
(2012) (describing the pressure on defendants accused of misdemeanors
to plead guilty to get out of jail).

THE UNEXONERATED

23

criminal conviction, especially for a minor offense, is low.
Even if they are released on bail, the trial will not be for
months, possibly longer, and it is often inconvenient or
expensive to go to court for things like “roll-call.” And,
they frequently know, and will be advised, that if they reject
a favorable plea and are found guilty, the judge will punish
them for exercising their right to trial.83 Thus, many
defendants will do whatever it takes to get out of jail or
avoid a trial; including pleading guilty to a crime they did
not commit.
Erma Faye Stewart, for example, was thirty and a
single mother of two when she was arrested as part of a
drug sweep based on the word of a confidential informant. 84
With no one to take care of her two small children, Stewart
decided to plead guilty to delivery of a controlled substance.
She was sentenced to ten years probation, and she was
required to pay $1800 in fines and report to her parole officer
monthly, an hour later, she was released.85 The confidential
informant was later exposed as a fraud and the charges were
dropped against the other defendants charged in the sweep,
who had not pled guilty.86 The reality is that, for many
defendants like Erma Stewart, a guilty plea often represents
the only readily available key to the cellblock door.
These defendants can be significantly harmed by their
convictions.87 Their criminal records can deprive them of
83

See Candace McCoy, Plea Bargaining as Coercion: The Trial Penalty and
Plea Bargaining Reform, 50 Crim. L. Q. 67 (2005) (describing the
magnitude of the “trial penalty” whereby harsher sentences are imposed
on a defendant who has been convicted after trial than would have been
imposed had she pled guilty).
84See

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plea/four/
stewart.html
85

Id.

Id. Stewart’s attempts to invalidate her guilty plea were rebuffed by
the courts.

86

See Michelle Alexander, Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, N.Y. Times,
March 10 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/opinion/
sunday/go-to-trial-crash-the-justice-system.html?_r=0, describing Erma
Faye Stewart’s case (Ms. Stewart was saddled with a felony record; she
87
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employment as well as educational and social opportunities
and a minor conviction can affect eligibility for professional
licenses, child custody, food stamps, student loans and
health care.88
B. Defendants who prevail during the appellate
process
Second, innocent defendants who are wrongfully
convicted and then win a new trial, may plead guilty in
order to secure their immediate or imminent release. This
was true of the West Memphis Three, and, under the right
circumstances can be an appealing option to an innocent
defendant. Why? Think about it from the wrongfully
convicted person’s perspective. They have been to trial and,
despite knowing they were innocent, the jury found them
guilty. Having seen the criminal justice system in operation,
“up close and personal” so to speak, it is not hard to imagine
that such a defendant would be reluctant to “roll the dice” at
a retrial.89 Even in cases where new evidence has come to
light, e.g., the DNA evidence in the case of the West
Memphis Three, the prosecution will often attempt to
bargain with the defendants in order to secure a guilty plea
and maintain the conviction. Most prosecutors and law
enforcement officers are hostile to post- conviction claims of
innocence.90 This has been described as a “conviction
psychology” which leads prosecutors and police to resist
claims of innocence in order to maintain the integrity of the
criminal justice system (by not admitting that the system had
was destitute, barred from food stamps, evicted from public housing and
as a result had her children placed in foster care).
88

Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra, at 104.

See Russel Covey, supra (“When the deal is good enough, it is rational
to refuse to roll the dice, regardless of whether one believes the evidence
establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and regardless of whether
one is factually innocent.”)

89

Daniel Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance To PostConviction Claims of Innocence, 84. B.U. L. Rev. 125(2010) (analyzing the
institutional and political factors deterring prosecutors from accepting
the legitimacy of post-conviction innocence claims).
90
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made a mistake), improve their own chances of promotion
(by maintaining conviction rates), and avoid wasting time
(as they still believe defendants are guilty regardless of how
persuasive the evidence of innocence is).91 Therefore,
prosecutors will often offer highly coercive deals involving
immediate or near immediate release from jail to secure a
conviction.
The West Memphis Three is not the only recent
example of this sad reality. We will briefly discuss several
instances where this happened.92 Sterling Spann was
convicted of the murder and sexual assault of an elderly
widow, Melva Neill, in 1981. The jury sentenced him to
death.93 During the post-conviction investigation, a private
investigator discovered that exactly sixty days before Ms.
Neill was brutally murdered, another elderly white woman
was killed in the same rural area pursuant to the same modus
operandi (the victim was sexually assaulted, strangled, and
left in the bathtub). The same investigator discovered that
exactly sixty days after the Neill murder, a third elderly
white female was sexually assaulted and strangled (she had
no bathtub but fluid was poured on the body).94 Further
investigation revealed that a paranoid schizophrenic, Johnny
Hullett, was convicted of killing the third victim. When
interviewed by members of Spann’s defense team, Hullett
insisted Spann was innocent and acknowledged his own
involvement in the murders.95 One of the leading forensic
pathologists in the world, Werner Spitz, examined all three
91

Id. In some cases, the plea is extracted to prevent the defendant from
bringing a civil action.
92

In two of which, in the interest of full disclosure, the Cornell Capital
punishment Clinic served as counsel of record for the defendant.
Keith Morrison, A 20 year quest for freedom, NBC news, June 11 2007,
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/19161103/ns/dateline_nbccrime_reports/t/-year-quest-freedom/# .Uij_KamgQts
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State v Spann, 334 S.C. 618, 620 (1999). Spann had been arrested and
was incarcerated at the time of the third homicide.

94

95

Keith Morrison, A 20 year quest for freedom, supra.
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autopsy reports and concluded that given the unique nature
of the strangulation in all three cases, the murders were
committed by one person.96 Leading criminal profilers
including the chief former FBI profiler, also concluded that
the crimes were committed by one person and that Hullett,
not Spann, matched the profile.97 Furthermore, the
fingerprint and serological evidence that led to Spann’s
conviction at trial was tainted. Even the State’s fingerprint
examiner conceded that the prosecution’s theory of how
Spann’s prints were left at the scene was “impossible.”98
Given this new evidence of innocence, the South Carolina
Supreme Court ordered a new trial.99
Prior to the retrial, the prosecution offered to allow
Spann to enter an Alford plea making him immediately
eligible for parole; the prosecution also agreed that it would
not oppose parole. Having spent twenty years on death
row, Spann, who had been out on bond for more than a year
prior to the scheduled trial, decided to take the deal.100 His
sister, who had been his “rock” during the many years he
was incarcerated, had recently been killed in an automobile
accident.101 And, one of his best friends on death row,
Richard Johnson, was executed, despite Johnson’s strong
claim of factual innocence.102 Devastated by his sister’s
96

97

State v Spann, 334 S.C. 618, supra, at 621.
Id.

98

99

Keith Morrison, A 20 year quest for freedom, supra.
State v Spann, 334 S.C. 618, supra.

100

101

Id.

Id.

See Johnson v. Catoe, 548 SE 2d 587 (2001). The South Carolina
Supreme Court rejected, by a 3-2 vote, Johnson’s final appeal which was
based on newly discovered evidence of innocence despite the fact that
one of Johnson’s co-defendants admitted that they committed the
murder (see 548 SE 2d at 594). Governor Jim Hodges then denied
Johnson’s request for clemency despite the fact that the victim’s widow
asked the Governor to commute the sentence, as did the state senator
from the district in which the crime occurred, based on the new
102
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death, and frightened by Johnson’s execution, Spann
decided he needed to put the matter behind him, plead
guilty and secure his freedom.103 His attorneys, one of
whom is a co-author of this article, concurred in Spann’s
decision.
Edward Lee Elmore recently made a similar choice.104
Elmore was convicted in Greenwood County, South
Carolina 1982 of the rape and murder of a woman for whom
he worked as a “yard-man.” His conviction was reversed on
direct appeal,105 but he was convicted and sentenced to
death a second time. On appeal from that conviction and
death sentence, a third trial was ordered (but this time only
on the issue of punishment), and Elmore was again
sentenced to death.106 After years of appeals, he was (finally)
granted a new trial by a panel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in December of 2011.107
Despite being one of the, if not the most conservative federal
court of appeals in the United States,108 Elmore’s panel
described the case as illustrating “extreme malfunctions in
the state criminal justice system.”109 The court of appeals
evidence. Hodges received 1850 letters and emails asking for clemency
for Johnson (see Jim Davenport, Hodges denies clemency, trooper’s killer to
die today, The Post and Courier, May 3 2002).
Morrison, A 20 year quest for freedom, supra. We would note that
Spann is successfully employed as a car mechanic in Charlotte, North
Carolina, and he is still happily married to the woman he met (and
married) while incarcerated on death row.

103Keith

Raymond Bonner, When Innocence Isn’t Enough, N.Y. Times, March 2
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/04/opinion/sunday/wheninnocence-isnt-enough.html?pagewanted=all
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State v Elmore 308 S.E. 2d 781 (1983).
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State v Elmore 332 S.E.2d 762 (1985)

Elmore v Ozmint 661 F.3d 783 (4th Cir. 2011).

See John H. Blume, The Dance of Death or (Almost) “No One Gets Out of
Here Alive”: The Fourth Circuit’s Capital Punishment Jurisprudence, 61 S.C.
Law Rev. 465 (2010).

108

109
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also described the prosecution’s case as “underwhelming,”
“flimsy” and indicative of “police ineptitude and deceit.”110
Following the Fourth Circuit’s decision, the
prosecution offered Elmore a deal; he could plead guilty
pursuant to Alford in exchange for time served and
immediate release. With the alternative being a year or more
in jail prior to a retrial and then having to face a fourth jury,
Elmore, with some reluctance, accepted the plea offer and
walked out of a maximum security prison several days
later.111 In this case too, his lawyers agreed with his
decision. Public reaction to the plea was mixed, with most
agreeing that the plea was unfair. The New York Times, for
example, published an editorial entitled, “When innocence is
not enough.”112 Elmore, who is happy to no longer be
incarcerated, spent more than thirty years in prison for a
crime he did not commit, and has not, and will never be,
truly “exonerated.”113
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Elmore v Ozmint, supra, at 871.

Jeffrey Collins and Meg Kinnard,, Ex-Death Row inmate walks out a free
man, The State, March 3 2012, http://www.thestate.com/2012/03/03/
2175467/ex-death-row-inmate-walks-out.html
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A “new” member has recently joined the unexonerated in this
category of case. George Souliotes spent nearly 17 years in prison after
being found guilty of a triple murder for allegedly starting a fire that
killed three people. A federal court granted the writ of habeas corpus
and vacated his conviction finding that the arson evidence was
scientifically flawed and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
adequately challenge it (Souliotes v Grounds, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
32717 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2013). The prosecution then offered Souliotes a
deal: he would be immediately released if he pled no contest to three
counts of involuntary manslaughter for failure to maintain working
smoke detectors (even though the house did have a smoke alarm). What
is most striking is that the prosecution conceded there was no evidence
that the fire had been started deliberately. In other words, there was no
evidence that the “crime” Souliotes pled guilty to was – in fact – a crime.
Nevertheless, Souliotes agreed to the “deal” and the trial judge accepted
it (see Maura Dolan, Arson Convict Proves His Innocence After 16 Years
Behind Bars, L.A Times, July 3 2013, http://www.latimes.com/local/la113
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C. Avoiding harsh alternative punishments.
Finally, factually innocent defendants may plead
guilty because they are afraid that they will be punished
(often quite severely) for exercising the Sixth Amendment
right to jury trial. In many murder cases, for example, the
prosecution will threaten the defendant with capital
punishment if he does not plead guilty.114 After being
notified that the prosecution was seeking the death penalty
against them, Phillip Bivens and Bobby Ray Dixon pled
guilty to a 1979 Mississippi rape and murder in exchange for
a sentence of life imprisonment.
In 2010, DNA testing

me-c1-freed-prison-20131017-dto,0,2232794.htmlstory# axzz2kRWBOhRP
). Souliotes apparently hoped the state would acknowledge he was
wrongfully convicted and compensate him for his confinement but the
plea ended any such possibility. (See Maura Dolan, Out of Prison and into
the
Unknown,
L.A.
Times,
October
17
2013,
http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-c1-freed-prison-20131017-dto,0,
2232794.htmlstory). Other examples of defendants who have prevailed
during the appellate process and then pled guilty include Kerry Max
Cook and Sunny Jacobs. Cook’s case is particularly interesting as Cook
has now been conclusively proven innocent. Cook was charged with,
convicted of and sentenced to death for the brutal murder and rape of
Linda Jo Edwards in Texas. The post-conviction investigation revealed
that the testimony of several key witnesses was perjured, and that the
prosecution suppressed exculpatory evidence. After Cook was granted a
new trial, the prosecution offered a no contest plea in exchange for a
sentence of time served. Cook accepted. Subsequently, DNA testing
conclusively established Cook’s innocence.
Thus Cook was able to
transition from the unexonerated to the exonerated (see
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plea/four/cook.ht
ml). Sunny Jacobs was convicted and sentenced to death for the 1976
murders of two law enforcement officers in Florida, a third co-defendant
received a life sentence after pleading guilty and testifying against her
and her partner. Following the discovery that the chief prosecution
witness had given contradictory statements, the prosecutor proposed an
Alford plea which Jacobs accepted. She was released in 1992 (see
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/additional-innocence-information).
114See,

James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 Colum. L. Rev.
2030, 2097 & n.165 (2000) and; Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L. Radelet,
Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 21, 63
(1987) (reviewing five cases in which innocent defendants pled guilty in
order to avoid the risk of a death sentence).
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conclusively established their innocence.115 This was also a
factor in the West Memphis Three case; the fact that Damien
Echols was on death row contributed to the decision of the
three men to plead guilty.116 But even where death is not a
sentencing option, prosecutors often have other potential
harsh sentences, including lengthy terms of imprisonment,
including life without parole as well as enhancements for
second or third time offenders that can be used to induce
reluctant defendants, even innocent ones, to plead guilty in
exchange for a reduction in the amount of time that will
have to be served.117
IV.

Reducing the Number of the Unexonerated?

There is clearly a problem; in a fair criminal justice
system innocent defendants would not plead guilty to
crimes they did not commit. But, they do. We are not
exactly sure how often it occurs, but the numbers are not so
small that the phenomena can be dismissed as artifact. On
the other hand, it is possible that innocent defendants
pleading guilty is simply the cost of doing plea business. In
115 See http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/When_the_Innocent
_Plead_Guilty.php (describing the case of Phillip Bivens and Bobby Ray
Dixon, and other cases in which innocent defendants have pled guilty,
usually to avoid the potential for a long sentence, or death).

David Koon, Jason’s choice: friendship, freedom and a principled stand,
supra.

116

117

See http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/James_Ochoa.php
(describing the case of James Ochoa who pled guilty to a 2005 carjacking
he did not commit to avoid a possible sentence of 25 years to life if
convicted at trial. Ten months after his conviction, DNA testing proved
his innocence). Another former Cornell Capital Punishment Clinic
client, Johnny Ringo Pearson was charged with murder and related
offenses. After nearly a decade of pre-trial litigation revolving around
Pearson’s competency to stand trial, he was found to be a person with
mental retardation and thus not eligible for the death penalty pursuant
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304
(2002). But, he was still facing a potential sentence of life imprisonment.
The prosecution offered a plea bargain pursuant to which Pearson would
be released after a relatively short additional term of imprisonment.
Given the alternatives, Pearson was willing to accept the bargain despite
strong evidence of factual innocence.
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the South there is an old saying: “People like sausage and
justice; but no one likes to see how either one is really
made.” Maybe that is true in the plea bargaining context. If
the system must induce virtually all defendants, somehow
and someway to plead guilty, then not only the guilty but
also the innocent will in some instances agree to plead
guilty. And, no feasible solutions come readily to mind. This
seems especially true for the persons charged with relatively
minor offenses who plead guilty for time served to get out of
jail. But, we are not quite ready to throw up our hands and
give up. So, let us briefly discuss some possibilities.
First, the criminal justice system could eliminate plea
bargaining. While this is viewed by most people, including
a majority of the current Supreme Court, as unthinkable,
many European criminal justice systems do not allow the
practice, and they manage their criminal dockets
adequately.118 In a world without the ability to plea bargain,
we would expect to see two adjustments benefitting
innocent (and also guilty) defendants. First, charges would
be dismissed in more cases. Without the ability to use many
of the currently sanctioned highly coercive practices,
prosecutors would dismiss weak cases rather than working
to get the “best” deal possible. And since, on average, weak
cases are more closely associated with innocence, innocent
defendants would benefit from a no-bargaining regime.
Second, charging decisions would have to become more
rational. In today’s plea driven market, prosecutors have
incentives to overcharge in order to start the “bidding” so to
speak.119 Without the ability to bargain, however,
prosecutors would be forced to charge more appropriately,
at least in regard to the expected disposition of cases.
Another benefit which would protect the innocent would be
WORLD PLEA BARGAINING: CONSENSUAL PROCEDURES AND THE
AVOIDANCE OF THE FULL CRIMINAL TRIAL 344, 363-66 (S. Thaman ed.
2010).

118

119See

Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial
Reforms, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 150 (2012) (noting that the current charging
system is akin to “sticker price” on a new car. It is not intended to be the
sale price, and only a fool would pay it. Rather it is intentionally set at
an (unreasonably) high price to facilitate the expected negotiations).
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that the prosecutors would not be able to freely “purchase”
the testimony of jailhouse informants with a dismissal or
reduction in charges or sentence, thus eliminating a leading
cause of wrongful convictions.120
One of the authors of this article’s thinking regarding
the morality and utility of plea bargaining has undergone a
metamorphosis over the years. During his years as a fulltime practicing criminal defense lawyer, he fully embraced
the conventional wisdom that pleas were essential. He could
see the limitations of the “mutuality of advantage” rationale,
but living inside the system prevented him from thinking
outside of it. He now believes there is much to be said for
jettisoning the plea driven system. It places the enforcement
of the criminal law in the hands of prosecutors and defense
lawyers, does not make legislators accountable for their
legislation (and thus promotes political posturing with
draconian legislation) and has a corrosive effect on the
attorney-client
relationship.121
However,
without
modifications to current minimum/maximum punishment
120

See ROB WARDEN, THE SNITCH SYSTEM: HOW INCENTIVIZED WITNESSES
PUT 38 INNOCENT AMERICANS ON DEATH ROW, CENTER ON WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW (2005),
available
at
http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/SnitchSystem
Booklet.pdf (describing informant testimony (often from jailhouse
informants) as the “leading cause of wrongful convictions in U.S. capital
cases”); see also Alexandra Natapoff, Beyond Unreliable, How Snitches
Contribute to Wrongful Convictions, 37 Golden Gate U.L. Rev 107, 109- 111
(presenting data on “snitch generated” wrongful convictions) (20062007).

Because most defendants are indigent, they are represented by public
defenders or court appointed counsel. Most of these attorneys have
large caseloads and incentives to dispose of cases as quickly as possible
with as little time spent on each case as possible. Thus, the first
conversation that many defendants have with their attorneys focuses on
a plea, i.e., what can the client “live with.” (See AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST
FOR EQUAL JUSTICE (2004), 16 at http://www.americanbar.org
/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_s
claid_def_bp_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.
pdf). This, understandably, leaves many defendants with the impression
that their attorney: a) does not care whether they are innocent or guilty
or whether their rights were violated; and, b) does not intend to conduct
a factual investigation.
121
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and sentencing regimes, which are, at least for the moment
not viable, a non-plea bargaining world is not the solution,
especially given that most of the rest of the world, again at
least for now, is not prepared to eliminate the practice.122
A similar, but more limited possibility would be not
to allow Alford pleas. It is, as we have previously noted, an
odd thing that we allow defendants to plead guilty to crimes
they insist they did not commit. A rational criminal justice
system, in our view, would respond to a denial of guilt with
something resembling the following: “ok, if you say you did
not do it, we have a procedure for determining whether the
evidence is sufficient to convict; it is called a trial.” Doing
away with Alford pleas would have the effect of forcing some
innocent defendants to go to trial, where they would
(hopefully) be acquitted. And, in other cases, prosecutors
would likely dismiss the charges instead of using the Alford
plea to seal the deal. But, on the other hand, Alford pleas do
have a practical value. They allow some guilty defendants
to plead who would not otherwise do so to save face
especially in cases involving sexual assaults (although that is
a strange reason to embrace the practice), and guilty-but-notguilty pleas also permit some potentially innocent
defendants who would be convicted at trial to obtain a better
outcome (which is the equivalent of saying that a little less
injustice beats more injustice). The most significant objection
In fact, if anything, the Supreme Court has “constitutionalized” the
status quo. Lafler v. Cooper, supra, 132 S.Ct. at 1397 (“the Court today
opens a whole new field of constitutionalized criminal procedure: plea
bargaining law”). In three cases over the last several years the Court has
found trial counsel ineffective for deficient performance in plea
bargaining. In Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S 356 (2010), 130 S.Ct.1473 (2010)
the Court held that it was deficient performance to give the client
erroneous advice regarding the immigration consequences arising from a
guilty plea. In Lafler, the Court found counsel’s performance deficient
based on erroneous advice that resulted in the defendant rejecting a
favorable plea in favor of going to trial (at which he was convicted and
received a substantially more severe sentence). And, in Missouri v. Frye,
supra, counsel was found ineffective for failing to inform the defendant
of a plea offer that lapsed. The defendant later pled guilty, but in
exchange for substantially less favorable terms. In doing so, the Court
stated that “the right to adequate assistance of counsel cannot be defined
or enforced without taking account of the central role plea bargaining
plays in securing convictions and determining sentences.” 132 S.Ct. at
1388.
122
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to this proposal, however, is that as long as plea bargaining
in general is still available in the non-Alford context, the most
likely result of eliminating the practice would be to simply
drive cases now resolved by Alford pleas “underground”
into the available plea bargaining market.
Third, the criminal justice system could (and
definitely should) require more judicial supervision of the
plea bargaining process. At one end of the spectrum, judges
could be authorized to strike the death penalty as a potential
punishment if the court thought it was being used only for,
or primarily for, “plea extraction” purposes. But, this is
likely to do little good. Even assuming a judge acting in
good faith,123 it is difficult to overcome the information gap
problem. How is a judge to know if the prosecutor is acting
coercively or vindictively except in the most egregious
cases?124 One possibility would be to adopt the model
suggested by Justice Powell in his Hayes dissent, where he
stated: “the question that must be asked is whether the
prosecutor might have reasonably charged the respondent

We would also note the problem of judicial hostility to criminal
defendants generally, especially in jurisdictions where judges are
elected. See Eric Sandberg-Zakian, Rethinking “Bias”: Judicial Elections and
the Due Process Clause after Caperton v A.T. Massey Coal Company, 64 Ark.
L. Rev. 179 (2010).
123

124

Another proposal we considered but ultimately opted not to advance
was (substantially) more rigorous enforcement of Rule 3.8 of the
American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which
states: “The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: (a) refrain from prosecuting a
charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause…”. As
our discussion of the West Memphis Three and George Souliotes cases
illustrated, this rule is “honored in the breach.” In theory, more vigorous
enforcement of the rule would prevent some of the extremely coercive
plea bargains offered in very weak cases. This would be particularly
relevant to cases classed in our second category (defendants who prevail
during the appellate process). However, as our colleague Brad Wendel
pointed out, there is also the danger that any significant increase in
disciplining prosecutors carries the significant risk of making the
situation worse, not better. This is true for two reasons. First, it
encourages lead prosecutors to misrepresent the strength of cases to
ensure the facial existence of probable cause. The second, and more
important reason, is that it would discourage prosecutors from offering
plea bargains to these defendants at all.
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under the Act in the first place”.125 However, unfortunately
even this may be unrealistic, judges are busy, dockets are
crowded; in large urban areas the system is driven by the
rule of “meat in/sausage out.”
Another needed reform in the area of judicial
supervision of plea bargaining is to allow trial and appellate
courts to consider the “voluntariness” of the plea. Current
legal doctrine focuses myopically on whether the plea was
knowing and intelligent. This, in turn, focuses on questions
like: was the defendant aware of the rights he was waiving
by entering the plea (the right to jury trial, the right to
testify, the right to confront witnesses)?126; was the
defendant aware of nature of the charges he was pleading
guilty to?127; was the defendant aware of the maximum
punishment?128; and, was there a factual basis for the plea?129
But very little attention is given to whether the plea was
truly voluntary. For example, the pleas entered by the West
Memphis Three easily satisfied the knowing and intelligent
inquiry. But, that was not what was wrong with the pleas
they were offered. The problem was that virtually no
rational defendant, even an innocent one, would turn the
deal down.
Thus courts should recognize, and more
importantly enforce, a voluntary guilty plea requirement.
The right would be somewhat akin to a voluntariness
challenge to an incriminating statement. Current confession
law doctrine uses a totality of the circumstances test and
asks courts to inquire whether, considering the totality of the
circumstances, the individual’s will was overborne by
coercive interrogation practices.130 While this would be a
step forward, it is not without significant downsides. First,
unless a court has the power not only to set aside the plea
125

Hayes, supra, at 370.

126

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(B)-(F)

127

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(G).

128

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(H)-(J).

129

130

Fed. R. Crim. P 11(b)(3).

See Colorado v. Connelley, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
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but also to dismiss the charges, then defendants like Spann
and Elmore benefit little from being returned to the status
quo ante. Second, totality of the circumstances tests very
rarely work to a criminal defendant’s benefit. In the
confession context, for example, voluntariness challenges are
many, successful ones are very, very few.131
Fourth, the current law in most jurisdictions barring a
defendant from bringing a civil action if he pleads guilty
could be modified. Allowing civil suits even if a defendant
pleads guilty would discourage the practice of forcing
innocent defendants to plead guilty, or in some cases, would
allow the individual to recoup some damages for the loss of
liberty. If the defendant prevailed in such a suit, it should
also serve to restore a person’s civil rights. However, the
objections are many. Guilty as well as innocent defendants
would sue. While, in many cases, courts could quickly
separate the “wheat from the chafe,” the nuisance suit factor
makes this effectively a non-starter.
Fifth, in our second category of cases, where innocent
defendants who are wrongfully convicted and then win a
new trial plead guilty in order to secure their immediate or
imminent release, a different prosecutor’s office could be
assigned to the case after the appellate reversal. The new
prosecutorial team, which in theory would not be as
invested in again securing a conviction, would decide
whether to dismiss the case, offer a plea or go forward with
the prosecution. This might help to reduce the effect of
institutional and political factors that prevent prosecutors
accepting the legitimacy of post-conviction innocence
claims132 and therefore encourage weak cases to be
dismissed rather than settled through plea bargaining.
However, again we are skeptical. Prosecutors are a “tight
knit” group and will be reluctant to earn the ire of their
See Missouri v Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 609 (2004) (stating that it takes
“unusual stamina” to maintain a statement is involuntary if authorities
have adhered to Miranda dictates and that “litigation over voluntariness
tends to end with the finding of a valid waiver”).
131

See Daniel Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance To PostConviction Claims of Innocence, supra.

132
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law

As our penultimate suggestion, we offer a more
detailed proposal that – to our knowledge – has not
previously been suggested in the literature. That is the use
of citizen panels to review guilty pleas after the fact in cases
where defendants allege they pled guilty to a crime they did
not commit. If this procedure were adopted, defendants who
plead guilty pre-trial in exchange for time served (or some
nominal additional punishment) would, upon request, have
their claim of innocence reviewed by a citizen review
panel.133 This would allow defendants to take the benefit of
the guilty plea (which as we have described above they will
often be forced to do) while still providing a forum for them
to make the case that they were in fact innocent and explain
why they pled guilty to a crime they did not commit.
Citizen review panels and boards are already used in
the United States in two main areas: allegations of police
misconduct;134 and, child welfare citizen review boards, to
ensure child welfare.135 These are independent boards
comprised of civilians, and while not courts, they do hear
cases, make objective determinations and have the authority
to make recommendations. For example police review
boards usually hear allegations of police misconduct made
by the public and recommend sanctions for officer
misconduct to the Chief of Police, Mayor and/or City
Council who can then implement the sanctions. Boards often
have the power to subpoena people, documents and other

133

A possible variation of this would be review by a panel of retired
judges. But for reasons that follow, we prefer to utilize private citizens.
134

See for e.g., the Las Vegas Citizen Review Board
https://www.citizenreviewboard.com/, the Pittsburgh Citizen Review
Board http://www.city.pittsburgh.pa.us/cprb/, the Atlanta Citizens
Review Board http://acrbgov.org/ and the San Diego Citizens Review
Board http://www.sandiego.gov/citizensreviewboard/
135 See for e.g., the New Mexico Child Abuse and Neglect Citizen Review
Board http://www.nmcrb.org/ and Oregon’s Foster Care Review Board
http://courts.oregon.gov/OJD/OSCA/cpsd/citizenreview/index.page
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evidence.136 Different review boards have different
procedures by which members are appointed to the boards,
for example some boards are elected by officials137 and other
boards appoint members from public volunteers.138
In the case of review of guilty pleas of persons
alleging innocence, one easy to implement option would be
to select a panel of citizens from those called for jury service.
Potential jurors are usually selected at random from lists of
those who are registered to vote and/or have a driver’s
license.139 Most potential jurors are not actually selected to
serve on a jury because most criminal cases plead and civil
cases settle.140 Instead of having these members of the public
effectively sit around and for the most part wait to be
selected for a jury (i.e., do nothing), some could serve on a
“plea review board.”
Review would not tantamount to a full trial and
would and should not be overly formalistic given that most
defendants will not be able to afford counsel. Instead, upon a
defendant’s request, the panel would be presented with
summary materials about the case (i.e., the arrest warrants
and indictment(s)/information, the sentencing range for the
alleged crimes charged, the sentencing range for the crime(s)
to which the defendant pled, the sentence imposed and how
long the defendant was incarcerated prior to the plea), and
an explanation from the defendant as to why she pled guilty
to a crime she did not commit. The panel would then
See, for
e.g., the Pittsburgh
http://www.city.pittsburgh.pa.us/cprb/
136

137

Citizen

Review

Board

See, for e.g., the Atlanta Citizens Review Board http://acrbgov.org/

138
See,
for
e.g.,
Las
Vegas
https://www.citizenreviewboard.com/

Citizen

Review

Board

See, United States Courts information at http://www.uscourts.gov/
FederalCourts/JuryService/about-jury-service.aspx
139

See, for e.g, State of Connecticut Judicial Branch jury statistics at
http://www.jud.ct.gov/statistics/jury/Jury_12.pdf (showing that in the
Connecticut Superior Court in 2012, 537,041 summonses were issued,
92,851 jurors served and 6,154 jurors were selected for trial).

140
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determine whether the totality of the circumstances suggests
“substantial doubt as to the accuracy of the guilty plea.” In
cases involving pleas to misdemeanors, the review panel
could be given the power to set aside a conviction and
functionally acquit the defendant if it concluded that there
was substantial doubt as to the accuracy of the plea. In
felony cases (where there is likely to be more resistance to
acquittal by a panel), a finding of substantial doubt could
qualify the defendant for a post-conviction relief proceeding
(and the appointment of counsel) on the grounds that it is
likely they pled guilty to a crime they did not commit.141 The
case would then go before a judge to determine whether
there was enough evidence to support the guilty verdict.
In many cases the evidence would show the
defendant was guilty, for example in cases where the
prosecution has strong evidence against a defendant or
where the defendant has no convincing explanation as to
why she entered a guilty plea. However, in other cases
defendants would be able to make the requisite showing.
Regardless, the guilty plea panel procedure we are
proposing would provide some opportunity to have
convictions set aside for “unexonerated” persons without
putting
significant
pressure
on
criminal
justice
infrastructure.
Thus defendants who decided to plead guilty rather
than go to trial would still have some opportunity to have
their guilt or innocence decided by a panel of their peers.
While historically this citizen involvement in the criminal
justice system was provided by jury trials,142 we no longer
have a system of jury trials. As the Supreme Court recently
stated, we have a system of pleas.143 But the core function
This is currently not a ground for post-conviction relief in any
jurisdiction we are aware of, although some states do have a general “in
the interests of justice” category of post-conviction claim. See, e.g., S.C.
Code § 17-27-20(a)(4) .
141

The Supreme Court has stated that juries “guard against a spirit of
oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers” and act as an intermediary
between the State and criminal defendants (United States v Gaudin 515
U.S. 506, 510-511).

142

143

Lafler, supra, at 1388.
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that jurors play – providing an accused “an inestimable
safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and
against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge”144 – is
equally important in the current “need to plead” system.145
The ability to have a citizen plea review panel would extend
the historical protection provided by juries to all defendants,
not just the 3% who go to trial.146 This is especially critical in
the current regime as innocent defendants who plead guilty

144

Duncan v Louisianna, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), at 156. See also Richard
Lippke, Plea Bargaining After Lafler and Frye: Plea Bargaining in the Shadow
of the Constitution, 51 Duq. L. Rev. 709, 714 (2013) (“Jury trials were
viewed as serving important public values, in ensuring the integrity of
charge adjudication procedures against the suspicions of corruption or
tyranny, and in educating the public by bringing them into contact with
more learned judges and involving them in debates about public
affairs”).
See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal
Procedure, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 911 at 916 (2006) (noting that in the current
system plea bargaining subverts rights to public information and
participation in criminal trials and describing plea bargaining as a “low
visibility procedure run by insiders”).
145

146

In her excellent article, The Plea Jury, 85 Indiana L. J. 731 (2010), Laura
Appleman proposes the use of a “plea jury” that would be impaneled to
sit alongside the judge in deciding whether to accept a guilty plea. Under
Appleman’s proposal, the jury would assess three things: whether the
factual basis admitted by the defendant fits the alleged crimes; whether
the plea was knowing and voluntary; and, whether the proposed
sentence is appropriate. We have no fundamental quarrel with this
suggestion, but we believe our proposal to be more pragmatic and
effective especially in cases in our first and the largest category
(defendants charged with minor or relatively minor offences). It is not
feasible to impanel a jury in such cases given the current criminal justice
infrastructure. Furthermore, the questions put to the jury in Appleman’s
proposal do not necessarily speak to the systemic pressures that lead to
innocent defendants pleading guilty.
For example, there is no
consideration of the strength of the underlying evidence and no
consideration beyond the current “knowing and voluntary” standard of
reasons why the defendant may be pleading guilty to something they
did not do. Additionally, if the plea jury does not accept the plea, then
the defendant is permitted to withdraw the plea and go to trial, a
different plea could be agreed to, or the plea jury could recommend a
different sentence. In many cases, this would not actually help an
innocent defendant who wanted or needed to be released from custody
as soon as possible.
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are often those who are most vulnerable to over-zealous
prosecutors.147
We acknowledge that there may be difficulties with
our proposal because some potential jurors selected to
participate on a guilty plea review panel may take the
“intuitive” approach that someone who pleads guilty
probably is guilty (the “I would never plead guilty to
something I did not do” mentality). However, this could be
remedied by providing the panel with some basic
information about “unexonerated” defendants. A more
fundamental problem may be that, without access to counsel
or resources, the procedure may be of limited value for
many persons who plead guilty. On the other hand, keeping
the process simple and not overly “legalistic” would
encourage participation even by unrepresented defendants.
We understand that it is not a perfect proposal, but it would
provide some access to justice to innocent defendants who
plead guilty and would also provide much needed citizen
involvement in the criminal justice system.
Finally, we could attempt to truly level the criminal
justice playing field by: a) adequately funding indigent
defense systems;148 b) increasing the quality of appointed
defense counsel149; c) mandating true open file policies by

147

Because establishing review by a guilty plea panel would provide
some oversight of prosecutors plea bargaining behavior and would
hopefully discourage the current widespread practice of threatening
excessive punishments in order to pressure defendants into pleading
guilty.
148

See John H. Blume and Sheri Lynn Johnson, Gideon Exceptionalism?,
122 Yale L.J. 2126 (2013) (detailing the pervasive problem of incompetent
defense counsel and inadequate funding for investigative and expert
services for indigent defendants).
149

See Wilbur v. City of Mt. Vernon, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171187 (W.D.
Wash. Dec. 4, 2013), in which the District Court found that public
defense systems in Mt Vernon and Burlington, Washington deprived
those faced with misdemeanor charges of the right to assistance of
counsel, in what had become a “meet and plead” system.
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prosecutors;150 d) not allowing jailhouse informants to
testify;151 and, e) preventing the use of what has been
recognized by the National Science Academy as “junk”
forensic science.152 But, in the final analysis, this is probably
the most unrealistic of all the proposals we have discussed.
V.

Conclusion

The case of the West Memphis Three may be unique
in the amount of publicity it attracted, but it represents only
the tip of the iceberg of “unexonerated” defendants. As
Justice Kennedy recently observed: “the reality [is] that the
criminal justice system today is for the most part a system of
pleas, not a system of trials.”153 The current criminal justice
system (this “system of pleas”) offers no effective safeguards
to defendants to protect them against over-zealous
prosecution or even effective oversight of prosecutorial
conduct. Vulnerable defendants are left at the mercy of
prosecutors, who not only need to deal with cases quickly to
clear their heavy workloads, but also often have professional
incentives to obtain convictions quickly.154 In this system, the
protections afforded by trial by jury, said to be “fundamental
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to the American scheme of justice”155 are lost, legal
regulation is almost non-existent and, as William Stuntz
stated: “law’s shadow disappears” leaving a system where a
defendant’s fate is dependent on “prosecutorial preferences,
budget constraints and political trends.”156 In this system,
innocent people are pleading guilty, and join the
“unexonerated,”often with severe consequences.
We have made several suggestions to reduce the
number of the “unexonerated” and to infuse additional
judicial oversight and citizen participation in to the criminal
justice system. Our most original suggestion is to use citizen
review panels made up of jury members to review guilty
pleas and ensure that there is not “substantial doubt” as to
the accuracy of a plea. If developed and implemented, this
could provide some opportunity to have convictions set
aside for “unexonerated” persons and, without putting
significant pressure on criminal justice infrastructure,
preserve the fundamental principle that: “the truth of every
accusation…should be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage
of…equals and neighbours, indifferently chosen and
superior to all suspicion”.157 We recognize the practical
difficulty in any proposed reform of the current plea
bargaining process and the substantial debate that has
already taken place as to reform of the system, but, at a
minimum, we hope to stimulate debate and discussion of the
plight of the “unexonerated.”
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